Personal Independence Identified as a Vulnerable Dimension of Bank Indonesia’s Autonomy

On Saturday, 13 June 2026, IAEI UK held an internal research discussion featuring Adi Rahmannur Ibnu, who presented his paper entitled “Rethinking Central Bank Independence in Indonesia: Is Personal Independence Degrading?” The paper had previously received a Best Paper Award at the 4th Journal of Central Banking Law and Institutions International Conference and Call for Papers 2026, hosted by the Bank Indonesia Institute. The online session was moderated by Kemala Putri Ayunda from IAEI UK’s Research Division and provided an opportunity for executive members to discuss recent developments in monetary governance and public institutions.

The presentation explored a dimension of central bank independence that, according to the paper, has often received less attention: the personal independence of senior office-holders. Focusing on Bank Indonesia (BI), the study examines the extent to which Indonesia’s legal and political framework protects the Governor and members of the Board of Governors from undue political and legal pressure in carrying out their responsibilities.

To address this question, the research combines a doctrinal analysis of Law No. 23 of 1999 and Law No. 4 of 2023 with a socio-legal assessment of how post-reformasi parliamentary politics has influenced the operation of these legal provisions. The study also draws upon central bank independence indices and comparative international best practices to develop a framework of personal independence centred on appointment and dismissal procedures, tenure, conflict-of-interest rules, and functional immunity.

One of the paper’s principal findings is that Indonesia’s formal legal framework broadly reflects international standards on central bank independence. However, the study argues that personal independence has become the weakest aspect of Bank Indonesia’s autonomy. According to the paper, this is linked to the expanded role of the House of Representatives (DPR) in appointments, parliamentary inquiries, and political oversight of the central bank.

The paper further illustrates this argument by referring to several high-profile cases, including the Bank Bali and Bank Century scandals. It also highlights increasingly politicised fit-and-proper tests and the practice of single-candidate nominations as examples of how individual central bankers may become vulnerable to political pressure despite the existence of formal legal safeguards.

During the discussion, participants reflected on the distinction between institutional independence and the independence enjoyed by individual office-holders. The presentation encouraged participants to consider how legal provisions, political processes, and institutional practice interact in shaping the autonomy of a central bank.

The session generated an engaging exchange of ideas among IAEI UK executive members, particularly on the relationship between law, politics, and monetary institutions in Indonesia. Participants also discussed the relevance of the study for broader debates on governance and institutional credibility in public policy.

The paper concludes that credible central bank independence in Indonesia requires stronger protection of personal independence. By highlighting this often-overlooked dimension, the study contributes to ongoing discussions on how legal and political frameworks can better safeguard the autonomy of central banks while maintaining public accountability.


Contributor: Muhamad Rizky Rizaldy